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Introduction
Security protocols are small programs that aim at securing communications over a public network like the Internet. Considering their increasing ubiquity a high level of assurance is needed in the correctness of such protocols. Developments in formal methods have produced considerable success in analysing security protocols. Automated tools such as Avispa [5] and ProVerif [9] are now capable of analysing large protocols involving several or even an unbounded num-ber of sessions. However, these analyses usually consider that the protocol is executed in isolation, ignoring other protocols that may be executed in parallel. The assumption that another parallel protocol cannot interfere with the protocol under investigation is valid if the two protocols do not share any secret data (such as cryptographic keys or passwords). But if such data is shared between protocols, then this assumption is not valid.
While the absence of shared keys between different protocols is obviously desirable, it is not always possible or realistic. For example, password-based protocols are those in which a user picks a password which forms one of the secrets used in the protocol. It is unrealistic to assume that users never share the same passwords between different applications. In this paper, we consider the situation in which secret data may be shared between protocols, and we particularly focus on password-based protocols. We investigate under what conditions we can guarantee that such protocols will not interfere with each other. Under certain conditions, we may have that if P 1 and P 2 are secure then P 1 | P 2 is secure.
For example, in the context of cryptographic pi calculi (e.g. spi calculus [3] , applied pi calculus [2] ), "is secure" is often formalised as observational equivalence to some specification. We have that P 1 ≈ S 1 and P 2 ≈ S 2 imply P 1 | P 2 ≈ S 1 | S 2 , where S 1 and S 2 are specifications, and therefore the security of the composition follows from the security of each protocol. Here, the composition of security relies on two facts. First, as mentioned, security means observational equivalence to a specification; the attacker is an arbitrary context, and P 1 ≈ S 1 means P 1 and S 1 are equivalent in any environment. Second, by forming the composition P 1 | P 2 we have made the assumption that P 1 and P 2 do not share any secret. Now suppose that P 1 and P 2 do share a secret w. To prove that their security composes, one would like to show that if νw.P 1 and νw.P 2 are secure then νw.(P 1 | P 2 ) is secure.
Note in particular that νw.(P 1 | P 2 ) is different from (νw.P 1 ) | (νw.P 2 ) because the later refers to two different secrets as they have different scope. In contrast with the previously mentioned composition result, this one does not hold in general. Additionally, the notion of security we consider in this paper is resistance to guessing attacks, which is not expressible as observational equivalence to some specification. Guessing attacks are a kind of dictionary attack in which the password is supposed to be weak, i.e. part of a dictionary for which a brute force attack is feasible. A guessing attack works in two phases. In a first phase the attacker eavesdrops or interacts with one or several protocol sessions. In a second offline phase, the attacker tries each of the possible passwords on the data collected during the first phase. To resist against a guessing attack, the protocol must be designed such that the attacker cannot discover on the basis of the data collected whether his current guess of the password is the actual password or not. If the attacker's interaction with the protocol during the first phase is limited to eavesdropping, then the attack is called passive; if the attacker can participate fully with the protocol, then it is active.
Several attempts have been made, based on the initial work of Lowe [22] , to characterize guessing attacks [13, 15, 18] . In [14] , Corin et al. proposed an elegant definition of resistance to passive guessing attacks, based on static equivalence in the applied pi calculus. A similar definition has also been used by Baudet [7] who uses constraint solving techniques to decide resistance against guessing attacks for an active attacker and a bounded number of sessions. Recent versions of the ProVerif tool also aim at proving resistance against guessing attacks for an active attacker and an unbounded number of sessions (at the price of being incomplete and not guaranteeing termination) [10] . Moreover, Abadi et al. further increase the confidence in this definition by showing its computational soundness for a given equational theory in the case of a passive attacker [1] .
In this paper, we study whether resistance against guessing attacks composes when the same password is used for different protocols. Protocols are modelled in a cryptographic process calculus inspired by the applied pi calculus. We use the definition introduced by Corin et al. (see [14] ). This allows us to provide results for protocols involving a variety of cryptographic primitives represented by means of an arbitrary equational theory. First we show that in the case of a passive attacker, resistance against guessing attacks composes (Section 4). In the case of an active attacker we prove that as expected, resistance against guessing attacks does compose when no secrets are shared. However, resistance against active guessing attacks does not compose in general when the same password is shared between different protocols. Nevertheless, we present a simple syntactic criterion, which we call well-tagged, which ensures that security composes even when the same password is reused for different protocols (Section 5). To provide an effective design methodology we also propose a simple transformation to ensure that the protocol is well-tagged. We prove that this transformation preserves resistance against guessing attacks (Section 6). Some of the proofs are omitted but can be found in [19] .
Related work. The dangers of ignoring the environment (i.e. all other protocols that may be running concurrently with the protocol in question) when analysing the security of a protocol have been demonstrated in several works (e.g. [12] ). The problem of secure composition has also been approached by several authors. Datta et al. provide a general strategy [17] whereas our composition result identifies a specific class of protocols that can be composed. In [21, 16] , some criteria are given to ensure that parallel composition is safe. Andova et al. provide conditions to allow a broader class of composition operations [4] .
However, none of these works deal with composing resistance against guessing attacks. They consider secrecy in terms of deducibility or authentication properties. To the best of our knowledge only Malladi et al. [23] have studied composition w.r.t. guessing attacks. They point out vulnerabilities that arise when the same password is used for different applications and develop a method to derive conditions that the environment has to satisfy to prevent multi-protocol guessing attacks. They identify as future work the problem solved in this paper, i.e. the development of techniques of general applicability to prevent multi-protocol guessing attacks. Moreover, their work relies on a definition of guessing attacks due to Lowe [22] which considers a particular set of cryptographic primitives. The results presented here are general and independent of the underlying equational theory. Our work is also related to Canetti et al. ' s [11] who use a different approach and different model to study universal composability of password-based key exchange protocols.
Preliminaries

Messages
A protocol consists of some agents communicating on a network. The messages sent by the agents are formed from data that the agents hold, as well as cryptographic keys and messages that the agent has previously received. We assume an infinite set of names N , for representing keys, data values, nonces, and names of agents, and we assume a signature Σ, i.e. a finite set of function symbols such as senc and sdec, each with an arity. Messages are abstracted by terms, and cryptographic operations are represented by function symbols. Given a signature Σ and an infinite set of variables X , we denote by T (Σ) (resp. T (Σ, X )) the set of terms over Σ ∪ N (resp. Σ ∪ N ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms over Σ, while the latter is simply called the set of terms over Σ. We write fn(M ) (resp. fv (M )) for the set of names (resp. variables) that occur in the term M . A substitution σ is a mapping from a finite subset of X called its domain and written dom(σ) to T (Σ, X ). Substitutions are extended to endomorphisms of T (Σ, X ) as usual. We use a postfix notation for their application. Similarly, we allow replacement of names: the term M { N / n } is the term obtained from M after replacing every occurrence of the name n by the term N .
As in the applied pi calculus [2] , we use equational theories for modelling the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitives. An equational theory is defined by a finite set E of equations M = N with M, N ∈ T (Σ, X ) and M, N without names. We define = E to be the smallest equivalence relation on terms, that contains E and that is closed under application of contexts and substitutions of terms for variables. Since the equations in E do not contain any names, we have that = E is also closed by substitutions of terms for names. 
. In this theory, we have that the terms T 1 and T 2 are equal modulo E enc , written T 1 = E enc T 2 , while obviously the syntactic equality
Assembling Terms into Frames
At some moment, while engaging in one or more sessions of one or more protocols, an attacker may have observed a sequence of messages M 1 , . . . , M . We want to represent this knowledge of the attacker. It is not enough for us to say that the attacker knows the set of terms {M 1 , . . . , M }, since he also knows the order in which he observed them. Furthermore, we should distinguish those names that the attacker knows from those that were freshly generated by others and which remain secret from the attacker; both kinds of names may appear in the terms. We use the concept of frame from the applied pi calculus [2] to represent the knowledge of the attacker. A frame φ = νñ.σ consists of a finite setñ ⊆ N of restricted names (those that the attacker does not know), and a substitution σ of the form
The variables enable us to refer to each M i . We always assume that the terms M i are ground. The namesñ are bound and can be renamed. We denote by = α the α-renaming relation on frames. The domain of the frame φ, written dom(φ), is defined as {x 1 , . . . , x }.
Deduction
Given a frame φ that represents the information available to an attacker, we may ask whether a given ground term M may be deduced from φ. Given an equational theory E on Σ, this relation is written φ E M and is formally defined below.
Definition 1 (deduction) Let M be a ground term and νñ.σ be a frame. We have that νñ.σ E M if and only if there exists a term
Intuitively, the deducible messages are the messages of φ and the names that are not protected in φ, closed by equality in E and closed by application of function symbols. When νñ.σ E M , every occurrence of names fromñ in M is bound by νñ. So νñ.σ E M could be formally written νñ.(σ E M ). 
Example 2 Consider the theory
E enc given in Exam- ple 1. Let φ = νk, s 1 .{ senc( s 1 ,s 2 ,k) / x 1 , k / x 2 }.
Static Equivalence
The frames we have introduced are a bit too finegrained as representations of the attacker's knowledge.
represent a situation in which the encryption of the public name s 0 (resp. s 1 ) by a randomly-chosen key has been observed. Since the attacker cannot detect the difference between these situations, the frames should be considered equivalent. To formalise this, we note that if two recipes M, N on the frame φ produce the same term, we say they are equal in the frame, and write (M = E N )φ. Thus, the knowledge of the attacker can be thought of as his ability to distinguish such recipes. If two frames have identical distinguishing power, then we say that they are statically equivalent. We say that two frames φ 1 and φ 2 are statically equivalent, φ 1 ≈ E φ 2 , when:
, and
Note that by definition of ≈, we have that φ 1 ≈ φ 2 when φ 1 = α φ 2 and we have also that νn.φ ≈ φ when n does not occur in φ.
Example 3 Consider again the equational theory E enc provided in Example 1. Let
, and 
The following lemma is a consequence of some lemmas stated in [2] and will be useful later on to establish our composition result. 
Lemma 1 Let
Modelling Protocols and Guessing Attacks
We now define our cryptographic process calculus for describing protocols. This calculus is inspired by the applied pi calculus [2] but we prefer a simplified version which is sufficient for the purpose of this paper. In particular we only consider one channel, which is public (i.e. under the control of the attacker). Moreover, we only consider closed processes: all variables appearing in terms are under the scope of an input. Finally, we only consider finite processes, i.e., without replication. As we will argue at the end of Section 5 this is not a restriction and our composition result carries over to an unbounded number of sessions.
Protocol Language
The grammar for processes is given below. One has plain processes P, Q, R and extended processes A, B, C. Plain processes are formed from the grammar P, Q, R := plain processes 0 null process
such that a variable x appears in a term only if the term is in the scope of an input in(x). The null process 0 does nothing; P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q. The conditional if M = N then P else Q is standard, but M = N represents equality modulo the underlying equational theory E. We omit else Q when Q is 0. The process in(x).P is ready to input on the public channel, then to run P with the actual message instead of x, while out(M ).P is ready to output M , then to run P . Again, we omit P when P is 0.
Further, we extend processes with active substitutions and restrictions:
where M is a ground term. As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write fv (A), bv (A), fn(A), bn(A) for the sets of free and bound variables (resp. names). Moreover, we require processes to be name and variable distinct, meaning that bn(A) ∩ fn(A) = ∅, bv (A)∩fv(A) = ∅, and also that any name and variable is bound at most once in A. Note that the only free variables are introduced by active substitutions (the x in { M / x }). Lastly, in an extended process, we require that there is at most one substitution for each variable. We also extend replacements of names { M / n } from terms to processes when the names fn(M ) ∪ {n} are not bound by the process. An evaluation context is an extended process with a hole instead of an extended process. Extended processes built up from the null process, active substitutions using parallel composition and restriction are called frames (extending the notion of frame introduced in Section 2.2). Given an extended process A we denote by φ(A) the frame obtained by replacing any embedded plain processes in it with 0.
Example 4 Consider the following process:
A = νs, k 1 .(out(a) | { senc(s,k 1 ) / x } | νk 2 .out(senc(s, k 2 ))).
We have that φ(A)
= νs, k 1 .(0 | { senc(s,k 1 ) / x } | νk 2 .0).
Semantics
Structural equivalence. We consider a basic structural equivalence, i.e. the smallest equivalence relation closed by application of evaluation contexts and such that
Using structural equivalence, every extended process A can be rewritten to consist of a substitution and a plain process with some restricted names, i.e.
In particular any frame can be rewritten as νn.σ matching the notion of frame introduced in Section 2.2. Note that static equivalence on frames coincides with [2] (even though our process calculus is different). We note that unlike in the original applied pi calculus, active substitutions cannot "interact" with the extended processes. As we will see in the following active substitutions record the outputs of a process to the environment. The notion of frames will be particularly useful to define resistance against guessing attacks.
Example 5 Note that in Example 4, we have that
We have the following useful lemma which comes from [2] . 
Lemma 2 Let
Operational semantics. We now define the semantics of our calculus. The labelled semantics defines a relation A − → A where is a label of one of the following forms:
• a label in(M ), where M is a ground term such that φ(A) E M . This corresponds to an input of M ;
• a label out(M ), where M is a ground term, which corresponds to an output of M ;
• a label τ corresponding to a silent action.
Labelled operational semantics ( − →) is the smallest relation between extended processes which is closed under structural equivalence (≡) and such that
Cont. A − → B C[A] − → C[B] where C is an evaluation context, and if = in(M ) then φ(C[A]) E M
These rules use standard ideas known from pi calculus derivatives. Note that the in(M ) label has as parameter the closed term being input, unlike in the applied pi calculus where the input term may contain variables. The side condition on Cont. ensures that the environment can deduce the input message M even though the context may restrict some names in M . The output of a message M adds an active substitution. Note that an output M may contain restricted names without revealing these names. As explained previously, some of the design choices of the semantics differ slightly from the applied pi calculus. Our choices allow us to consider a very simple structural equivalence and avoid unnecessary complications in the proofs of our main results. We denote by → the relation − → | ∈ {in(M ), out(M ), τ}, M ∈ T (Σ) and by → * its reflexive and transitive closure.
Example 6
We illustrate our syntax and semantics with the well-known handshake protocol.
The goal of this protocol is to authenticate B from A's point of view, provided that they share an initial secret w. This is done by a simple challenge-response transaction: A sends a random number (a nonce) encrypted with the shared secret key w. Then, B decrypts this message, applies a given function (for instance f (n) = n + 1) to it, and sends the result back, also encrypted with w. Finally, the agent A checks the validity of the result by decrypting the message and checking the decryption against f (n). In our calculus, we model the protocol as νw.(A | B) where
• A = νn.
out(senc(n, w)). in(x). if sdec(x, w) = f (n) then P • B = in(y). out(senc(f (sdec(y, w)), w)).
where P models an application that is executed when B has been successfully authenticated The derivation described in Figure 1 represents a normal execution of the protocol. For simplicity of this example we suppose that x ∈ fv (P ).
Guessing Attacks
The idea behind the definition is the following. Suppose the frame φ represents the information gained by the attacker by eavesdropping one or more sessions and let w be the weak password. Then, we can represent resistance against guessing attacks by checking whether the attacker can distinguish a situation in which he guesses the correct password w and a situation in which he guesses an incorrect one, say w . We model these two situations by adding { w / x } (resp. { w / x }) to the frame. We use static equivalence to capture the notion of indistinguishability. This definition is due to Baudet [7] , inspired from the one of [14] . In our definition, we allow multiple shared secrets, and writew for a sequence of such secrets. Note that this definition is general w.r.t. to the equational theory and the number of guessable data items. Now, we can define what it means for a protocol to be resistant against guessing attacks (in presence of an active attacker). Intuitively, a protocol A is resistant against guessing attacks on a weak password w if it is not possible for an active attacker to mount a guessing attack on it even after some interactions with the protocol during a first phase. In other words, for any process B such that A → * B (note that the attacker can intercept and send messages during this phase), the frame φ(B) has to be resistant to guessing attack. (sdec(x 1 , x) ) ? = sdec(x 2 , x) allows us to distinguish the two associated frames:
Definition 3 Let
Definition 4 Let A be a process andw ⊆ bn(A). We say that
νw.(A | B) → * D with φ(D) = νw.νn.({ senc(n,w) / x 1 } | { M / x 2 }).
The frame φ(D) is not resistant to guessing attacks against w. The test f
This corresponds to the classical guessing attack on the handshake protocol (see [20] ).
After a normal execution of one session of this protocol,
νw.(A | B)
out(senc(n,w))
where M = senc(f (sdec(senc(n, w), w) ), w) = E senc(f (n), w).
Figure 1. Example 6
the attacker learns two messages, namely senc(n, w) and senc(f (n), w). By decrypting these two messages with his guess x, he can easily test whether x = w and thus recover the weak password w by brute-force testing.
Composition Result -Passive Case
The goal of this section is to establish a composition result in the passive case for resistance against guessing attacks. We first show the equivalence of three definitions of resistance against guessing attacks: the first definition is due to Baudet [7] and the second one is due to Corin et al. [14] . The last definition is given in a composable way and establishes our composition result (see Corollary 1). Proof. Let φ be a frame such that φ ≡ νw.φ . We first establish that the two first statements are equivalent. Indeed, we have that:
Proposition 1 Let
Now, we show that 3 ⇒ 2. We have the following implications.
Finally, we prove that 2 ⇒ 3.
Now, by relying on Proposition 1 (item 3.), it is easy to show that resistance to guessing attack againstw for two frames that share only the namesw is a composable notion. This is formally stated in the corollary below:
is also a frame (this can be achieved by using α-renaming).
If φ 1 and φ 2 are resistant to guessing attacks againstw then νw.(φ 1 | φ 2 ) is also resistant to guessing attacks againstw.
Proof. By relying on Proposition 1 (point 3.), we have that φ 1 ≈ φ 1 {w /w} and also that φ 2 ≈ φ 2 {w /w}. Now, thanks to Lemma 2 (item 2.), we have that
This allows us to conclude that
which means that the frame νw.(φ 1 | φ 2 ) is resistant to guessing attacks againstw.
Note that a similar result does not hold for deducibility (see Definition 1): even if w is neither deducible from φ 1 nor from φ 2 , it can be deducible from φ 1 | φ 2 . Such an example is given below.
Example 8
Consider again the equational theory E enc .
Consider the two following frames:
Indeed, the term sdec(x 1 , x 2 ) is a recipe of the term w.
In the case of password-only protocols, i.e., protocols that only share a password between different sessions and do not have any other long-term shared secrets we have the following direct consequence. We can prove resistance against guessing attacks for an unbounded number of parallel sessions by proving only resistance against guessing attacks for a single session. An example of a password-only protocol is the well-known EKE protocol [8] , which has also been analysed in [14] . Figure 2 .
Example 9 The EKE protocol [8] can be informally described by the following 5 steps. A formal description of this protocol in our calculus is given in
In the first step (EKE.1) A generates a new private key k and sends the corresponding public key pk(k) to B, encrypted (using symmetric encryption) with the shared password w. Then, B generates a fresh session key r, which he encrypts (using asymmetric encryption) with the previously received public key pk(k). 
We have verified this static equivalence using the YAPA tool [6] .
Corin et al. [14] also analysed one session of this protocol (with a slight difference in the modelling). It directly follows from our previous result that the protocol is secure for any number of sessions as the only secret shared between different sessions is the password w.
Composition Result -Active Case
In the active case, contrary to the passive case, resistance against guessing attacks does not compose: even if two protocols separately resist against guessing attacks on w, their parallel composition under the shared password w may be insecure. Consider the following example. Figure The previous example may not be entirely convincing, since there is no environment in which either of the separate processes νw.A and νw.B is executable. We do not give a formal definition of what it means for a process to be executable. Therefore we present a second example (more complicated but in the same spirit) in which each of the constituent processes admits a complete execution. Figure 2 where the occurrences of 0 in A and B have been replaced by out(senc(w, ra)) and in(y).out (sdec(y, r) (k), w) ).
Example 10 Consider the processes defined in
Example 11 Consider the processes A and B defined in
in(y 1 ). in(x 1 ).
out(senc(aenc(r, sdec(y 1 , w)), w)). let ra = adec(sdec (x 1 , w) , k).
in(y 2 ). out(senc(na, ra)).
out(senc( sdec(y 2 , r), nb , r)). in(x 2 ). in(y 3 ). if proj 1 (sdec(x 2 , ra)) = na then if sdec(y 3 , r) = nb then out(sdec (proj 2 (sdec(x 2 , ra) ), ra)). 0 0
We use the construction let x = M to enhance readability. The semantics of this construction is to simply replace x by M in the remaining of the process. This example shows that there is no hope to obtain a general composition result (even if we restrict to protocols that are executable) that holds even for a particular and relatively simple equational theory. To reach our goal, we consider a restricted class of protocols: the class of well-tagged protocols.
Well-tagged Protocols
Intuitively, a protocol is well-tagged w.r.t. a secret w if all the occurrences of w are of the form h(α, w). We require that h is a hash function (i.e., has no equations in the equational theory), and α is a name, which we call the tag. The idea is that if each protocol is tagged with a different name (e.g. the name of the protocol) then the protocols compose safely. Note that a protocol can be very easily transformed into a well-tagged protocol (see Section 6) . In the remainder, we will consider an arbitrary equational theory E, provided there is no equation for h. Other ways of tagging a protocol exist in the literature. For example, in [16] encryption are tagged to ensure that they cannot be used to attack other protocols. That particular method would not work here; on the contrary, that kind of tagging is likely to add guessing attacks. A = νw, s.out(senc(s, w) Another tagging method we considered is to replace w by α, w (instead of h(α, w)), which has the advantage of being computationally cheaper. This transformation does not work, although the only counterexamples we have are rather contrived. For example, this transformation does not preserve resistance against guessing attacks as soon as the equational theory allows one to test whether a given message is a pair (see Example 13). In particular this is possible in the theory E enc by testing whether proj 1 (x), proj 2 (x) = E enc x.
Definition 5 (well-tagged) Let
Example 12 Let
Example 13 Consider the equational theory
The process A is resistant to guessing attacks against w since the last instruction can never been executed. However, the protocol obtained by replacing w by α, w is clearly not.
Note that we can built a similar example without using α in the specification of A. We can simply compare the first component of two ciphertexts issued from the protocols. This should lead to an equality (i.e. a test) which does not necessarily exist in the original protocol.
Composition Theorem
We show that any two well-tagged protocols that are separately resistant to guessing attacks can be safely composed provided that they use different tags. The following theorem formalizes the intuition that replacing the shared password with a hash parametrized by the password and a tag is similar to using different passwords which implies composition. 2 .A 2 (different password) by maintaining a strong connection between these two derivations. Intuitively, as A 1 is α-tagged and A 2 is β-tagged we can simply replace h(α, w) by h(α, w 1 ) and h(β, w) by h(β, w 2 ) in any execution.
Theorem 1 (composition result) Let
Conclusion
We investigated the composition of protocols that share a common secret, and answered the question of whether such composition preserves resistance to guessing attacks. In the passive case (where the attacker cannot interact with the protocol but can analyse the transcript of messages it generated), we showed that if the two protocols individually resist guessing attacks, then the composition does too. In the active case, we showed that this result does not hold in general, but we showed that one could tag the protocols in such a way that they compose without compromising the resistance to guessing attacks.
An alternative direction of research would be to investigate whether there are conditions on the equational theory and on the protocols that would make the composition result hold without tagging for the active case. It would also be interesting to consider the case where additional long term keys are shared. Broader directions for future research include composition of other security properties, such as observational equivalence for processes that share secrets, and different composition operators, e.g. sequential composition.
